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Ege: An Essay on Real and Personal Propert, Or, Fixtures Unmasked

AN ESSAY ON REAL AND PERSONAL
PROPERTY, OR, FIXTURES UNMASKED
STEPHEN

M.

EGE*

[Tihe mind in apprehending also experiences sensations which, properly speaking, are qualities of the mind
alone. These sensations are projected by the mind so as to
clothe appropriatebodies in external nature. Thus the bodies are perceived as with qualities which in reality do not
belong to them, qualities which in fact are purely the offspring of the mind. Thus nature gets credit which should
in truth be reserved for ourselves: the rose for its scent: the
nightingale for his song: and the sun for his radiance. The
poets are entirely mistaken. They should address their lyrics to themselves, and should turn them into odes of selfcongratulationon the excellency of the human mind. Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; merely
the hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly.I
This quotation from Whitehead does not represent his view of the
nature of things, for he believed it far more difficult to separate
mind from nature than this passage suggests. 2 Lawyers might, with
equal credulity, survey their landscape: what the author proposes
to undertake here is an inquiry into the reality of real and personal
property as existing legal entities. Philosophical pursuits in the
study of law have seemingly always met with an impatient audience
because they appear to be so far removed from the practical affairs of men. This reciprocal worldly indifference may account for
the relative paucity of literature on the subject; what little there is
perhaps indicates the difficulty of bringing the subject to life. 3 Legal
reasoning, like nature, has, for the most part, been taken as it is: a
shining patina has been taken for the structure itself.
Yet if nature is without sound, scent or color, it is just as true,
and just as striking, to observe that nature is without owners. Nature is unowned. Surely any man who would maintain such a propo*
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sition in the face of a world littered with property has, as it is said,
taken leave of his senses. But there is certainly respectable authority for the proposition that something would still exist, even were
there no bipeds such as we who walk the face of the planet and attest
to the fact of the existence of things other than ourselves.4
But property, as an existing thing, is certainly a lower order of
reality than are the primary or secondary qualities of things, as is
demonstrated by the fact that property can disappear before our
very eyes. A case in point:'
In Massachusetts in January of 1836 Davenport mortgaged his
lot and dwelling house to Peirce to secure payment of a promissory
note. Thereafter Davenport, the mortgagor, purchased another lot
and undertook to move the house from his mortgaged lot to the new
lot. After attempting to move the house whole, he disassembled it
and carried it piece by piece. There he erected a new house, of
approximately the same dimensions, partly from the removed materials and partly from newly purchased materials. When the new
house was completed, Davenport conveyed the house and new lot
to the defendant who, without actual knowledge of the mortgage,
assumed possession.
The plaintiff mortgagee Peirce sued the defendant purchaser in
trover on two counts: one, for the conversion of the newly erected
house and the other, an apparently more limited claim, for the conversion of the old materials with which it was built. The plaintiff
was nonsuited on both counts. The court reasoned that, although
the house was originally owned by the mortgagee under Massachusetts law,' the house became the property of the owner of the land
upon which it was placed. Thus Davenport came once again to
"own" the house. "The materials used in its construction ceased to
be personal property, and the owner's [the mortgagee's] property
4. A.N. WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD 89-90 (1967). The stuff "out
there" is his "actual entities." Readers will be saddened to learn that it is neither "stuff"
nor "out there." See, e.g., A.N. WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY 54 (1969).
5. Peirce v. Goddard, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 559 (1839).
6. At that time in Massachusetts a mortgage was evidently being viewed as a conveyance of the legal estate upon a condition subsequent. Erskine v. Townsend, 2 Mass. 493
(1807); Wheelock v. Henshaw, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 341 (1837). One interesting discussion of
the ownership of mortgaged land was "Judge Trowbridge's Reading," discussed in Chaplin,
The Story of Mortgage Law, 4 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1890), and apparently given the sanction of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts by virtue of a reprint in the law reports: 8 Mass.
551 (1812).
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in them was divested as effectually as though they had been destroyed." 7 The newly erected house, then, was Davenport's to sell
because he was the owner of the lot to which the house was removed.
The mortgaged property simply disappeared!'
This astonishing phenomenon, of course, is an everyday occurrence; it happens when trees are cut, when crops are harvested,
when minerals are extracted, and, going the other way, when bricks
and mortar form a wall, and when that wall is painted.
That these occurrences are regarded as changes in kind, as the
literal creation and destruction of existing things, is worth pondering. But we need not conclude at once that a two-fold scheme of
property classification, one for detached things and one for attached
things, is needed. Suppose only one man were to survive the seemingly inevitable holocaust which twentieth or twenty-first century
man seems destined to inflict upon himself. He would likely, in
surveying his lonely dominion, feel called upon to distinguish between rubble that moved or could be moved and that which did or
could not. For the man of practical affairs it is true that, in infinite
retrogression, things that do not move are always attached to something which is itself attached; only Archimedes' lever can disrupt
7. 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 559, 562 (1839).
8. Interestingly, the result reached in Peirce (i.e., no liability in damages against the
mortgagor's vendee) is evidently like that which the courts of England would have reached,
under Dean Ames' analysis, before the expansion of the writs of replevin and detinue. Ames,
Disseisin of Chattels (pts. 1-3), 3 HARv. L. REv. 23, 313, 337 (1889-90). Assuming the plaintiff
mortgagee Peirce could somehow be regarded as seised of the constituent materials of the
house, even though not in possession, then the removal of the house from the mortgaged lot
could be regarded as a disseisin of chattels. Because of the hurdles imposed on the appeal of
larceny, discussed in Ames, The History of Trover, 11 HLv. L. Rev. 277, 278 (1897), the
disseisee (plaintiff mortgagee) of chattels, unlike the disseisee of land, did not effectively
retain a right in rem; the disseisee could not recover the goods. At some point this procedural
quirk developed into the doctrine that the disseisor gained absolute ownership in the thing
tortiously taken. Accordingly, a charge to the jury given in 1486, well after, according to
Ames, trespass and replevin were no longer regarded as proceeding on inconsistent theories
of ownership, is not surprising (though anachronous by Ames' own account):
If one takes my horse vi et armis and gives it to S, or S takes it with force and arms
from him who took it from me, in this case S is not a trespasser to me, nor shall I
have trespass against him for the horse, because the possession was out of me by the
first taking; then he was not a treaspasser to me, and if the truth be so, find the
defendant not guilty.
Ames, The Disseisinof Chattels, 3 HARv. L. REv. 23, 29 (1889).
Thus, to return to Peirce v. Goddard, if it is the taking of materials of the house by the
mortgagor of which the plaintiff mortgagee is complaining, Peirce would have no cause of
action against the defendant vendee in 15th century England. The disassembly of the old
house compounds Peirce's difficulties of recovery.
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this truism. A brick is still a brick whether movable or embedded
in a wall, but its utility in the two situations is greatly dissimilar; a
brickbat is not a brick wall. Simply put, then, things movable or in
motion differ profoundly in human significance from things at rest.
They can be the source of our protection or the cause of our destruction. We therefore pay heed to the difference.
Enter Eve.
Society brings with it, as lawyers are aware, certain difficulties.
One of them is the division of nature's bounty among its members.
Physical things, in complex and diverse ways, give value to us:
buildings provide shelter; the Colosseum, to the extent that it can
withstand the onslaught of Roman traffic, reveals beauty; the facade of the Federal Archives building in Washington abjures us to
"Study the Past." A similarly diverse catalogue of attributes could
be provided for any physical thing.
Ownership derives from society's imperative that these values
be divided among its members, that everything may not be held in
common. And society has erected an apparatus to protect this division. If physical things were not owned, if everything floated freely
about, then seemingly there would be no trespass, no theft, no tort
even for physical injury to one's, as we say, own body (if we conceive
of our relationship with our bodies as one of ownership). It is
unquestionably true that the allocation of values associated with the
ownership of a given thing has changed with time, but it also seems
true that there is an irreducible residuum of values which may not
be commonly shared. Society is impossible without some degree of
ownership.
Once we accept the premise that ownership is a necessary condition of society, the necessity for a tagging system, a system which
links a thing owned with its owner, arises. We may profitably return
to our Massachusetts case in developing the tagging system. It will
be remembered that in that case the court held that the mortgagee
had no interest in the mortgaged house once it was moved from the
plot on which it stood originally. The new owner's property interest
in land flowed upward into the house, like ink on a blotter, rather
than the mortgagee's property interest in the house flowing downward to the ground.' It seemed too much for the court to hold that
9. Compare Pulcifer v. Page, 32 Me. 404 (1851) (involving only personalty) discussed
in 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 31.2 (1965) [hereinafter cited
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the house remained the property of the mortgagee once it had been
moved to its new location. The mortgagee owned the first plot only.
The court indicated that only the mortgagor Davenport could be
held liable for the conversion of the materials; thus, the plaintiff was
nonsuited.
The court, however, exhibited some ambiguity over what
Peirce, the mortgagee, owned: the lumber or the space it occupied.
Let us, in an attempt to tag what Peirce owned, posit the real estate
property system solely, thereby excluding the personal property system. In so doing, we will introduce an abstraction which expresses
a valuable incident of structures which we also wish to protect, i.e.,
that physical things define space. Where physical things are not,
there is space in which we may move.' 0 The real estate property
system posits that every point in space is owned. If it be asked,
therefore, who owns a structure, one asks simply what the coordinates in question are, or more simply still, "Where is it?" So long
as the coordinates may be ascertained," and an index of owners and
coordinates maintained, the real estate property system unerringly
links the owner with his property. Moreover, Peirce will be delighted
to find that under this tagging system he has nothing to lose. However much lumber Davenport may trot off with or however much
earth he may gouge from the original plot, Peirce's space remains,
sacrosanct.
A further interesting consequence of the real estate property
system is that, as things move, ownership of them changes
as GILMORE]. It is difficult to determine which property accedes to which. See cases cited id.
at 842, n. 6. See also Gilmore's discussion of when a security interest "carries over" into
something of which it is a part, i.e., the "product." Id. at 849. As to when this occurs, see id.

§ 31.5.
10. This is the doctrine of simple location,
which underlies the whole philosophy of nature during the modem period. It is
embodied in the conception which is supposed to express the most concrete aspect
of nature. The Ionian philosophers asked, What is nature made of? The answer is
couched in terms of stuff, or matter, or material-the particular name chosen is
indifferent-which has the property of simple location in space and time, or, if you
adopt the more modem ideas, in space-time.
A.N. WHrrEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WoRLD 48-49 (1967).

11. Obviously, as man extends his dominion into the incredible expanses of space, what
the author understands to be the primitive notions behind a scheme that envisions all of space
as existing within a fixed, rigid and "unreal" three-dimensional lattice, must give way to the
strictures of more advanced conceptions of space and time. It will be more difficult to say
where a thing is and whether it is moving. See A. EINsTEIN, THE MEANING OF RELATVrry 55

(5th ed. 1922).
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chameleon-like. For as soon as Davenport moves the lumber over an
adjacent tract, ownership passes to that tract's owner. Even when
Davenport reaches his own tract, however, it takes an exercise of
will to remember that as he carries his lumber about, his ownership
of it is secure because he owns the space in which he moves, and
not because he owns the space-obtruding, tangible lumber.
But if persons are to walk about a tract owned by another
without finding themselves suddenly stripped of their former possessions, another system of ownership identification must be devised. It would not be sufficient merely to limit the effect of ownership when someone passes through owned space, for that would still
leave open the question of who, if not the landowner, owns the
object; either that or we create an exceedingly troublesome "roving
coordinate" exception to the realty system.
Let us, then, momentarily cast aside the real estate property
system as inconvenient and posit another, the personal property
system. In so doing, we assume the exclusion of the real property
system. We take, as a starting point, our insistence that Davenport
owned the lumber itself, a tangible, physically describable thing; it
will be owned regardless of where it might be. To identify his property the obvious solution for Davenport (or Peirce) is simply to point
out the lumber; "That's it," he might say. In so doing he could rely
on a tag, 2 paper or metal, or because his tag might be removed, on
a description of the thing. Under the personalty system, if it be
asked who owns something, we may respond "What is it?" The
description of the appearance of a thing must be sufficiently general
to be conveniently remembered and guard against the possibility of
some obliteration of its distinctive features. Of course, the more
general the description, the less distinctive the object owned and the
more difficult it will be to assign ownership. Suppose Henry Ford's
wildest dreams had come true, and the country were today traversed
only by black sedans, but none having a serial number on the engine
block. Truly, an horrible fabrication.
Suppose, now, relying exclusively on the personalty system,
Peirce wishes to assert his interest in the mortgaged house moved
to Davenport's newly acquired plot. Davenport's only objection can
be that, by depositing Peirce's house upon Davenport's land,
Davenport was deprived of the use of the land. Davenport may at
12.

It is by this method that it is proposed to identify spacecraft. M.S. McDouGAL, H.D.

LASSWELL & I.A. VLAsiC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 566-74 (1963).
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least take comfort from his freedom to move in and out of Peirce's
house at will, for Peirce owns the house only, not any space it may
define and occupy. By concentrating our attention solely on the
physical thing owned by Peirce or Davenport and making no reference to who may own the space which surrounds those objects, we
destroy a valuable incident, namely, a space in which to use them.
Assuming we may conveniently describe and index and sufficiently
distinguish every physical thing (whether it be in terms of size,
shape, color or even location), the personalty system would offer no
security from physical intrusion into the space surrounding owned
things.
Neither property identification system alone proves satisfactory, remembering, again, that we have undertaken this exercise
because we have concluded that not all valuable aspects of the
physical things which structure our environment (indeed, are our
environment) may be commonly shared. We must, therefore, divide
these values among society's members, and to do so, we must construct a tagging system, i.e., a system that links the thing owned
with the member of society who owns it. We have discovered that
the realty system protects the integrity of space and unerringly
indexes owners, but is so rigorous in its extension that movement
out of the owned space necessarily operates to deprive the former
owner of his ownership; there is no way that ownership can be regained short of acquiring ownership of the tract upon which the
movable object is situated. The personalty system, on the other
hand, by fixing upon things rather than space as the object of ownership, provides a sufficient owning tag for things in motion or stationary. There are minor irritations associated with it-it taxes the
imagination of man in a world peopled by an abundance of massproduced articles." But there is a problem far more grave. The
13. Whitehead's view is rather more inclusive:
[W]hen discussing general terms . . . [Locke] adds parenthetically another type
of ideas which are practically what I term 'objectified actual entities" and "nexlis."
He calls them "ideas of particular things"; and he explains why, in general, such
ideas cannot have their separate names. The reason is simple and undeniable: there
are too many actual entities. He writes: "But it is beyond the power of human
capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of all the particular things we meet with:
every bird and beast men saw, every tree and plant that affected the senses, could
not find a place in the most capacious understanding." The context shows that it is
not the impossibility of an "idea" of any particular thing which is the seat of the
difficulty; it is solely their number.
A.N. WHrrEHEAD, PROCESS AND RELrrv 67 (1969).
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personalty system takes no account of the space needed in which to
use things. Of course, some practical standards could be developed,
perhaps a "utility space" in which to use the owned object. Even
so, a scheme which posits that objects, not space, is owned would
present an exceedingly confused state of affairs, especially as men,
like Davenport, began moving things which, because they had been
left "in place" for a time, had begun to be used as a point of reference. The world would be in a state of perpetual disruption as men
shuffled their possessions, house and all, across the surface of the
plant, willy-nilly.
The seeds of the realty system are thus planted in the personalty system. It is tempting to conclude that when a man owns a
thing at rest, his utility space entitles him to prevent encroachment
on his land, as Davenport would do to Peirce. Of course, if we go
too far, and adopt the realty system, we are left again with the
difficulties which it presents when carried alone to rigorous extension. Movement, as it were, fixes the tagging rule by creating practical impediments to the use of the alternate system.
But to repeat, without Eve, this gerrymandered system for the
division of the value of things and of space would be unnecessary.
The distinction between things that we regard as moving or capable
of motion and as stationary or, as it is significantly said, between
movables and immovables (i.e., those which we can move), 4 reflects
a circumstance of profound importance in our environment. Society
brings with it the necessity to build an ownership scheme upon that
distinction.
The "things," then, which are the subject of ownership are
inextricably intertwined with the imperatives of the social condition, of sharing and keeping to oneself our physical environment, the
space and matter in which we exist. This view is directly at variance
with that of Professor Hohfeld, one of a small handful of men who
have successfully given a philosophical dimension to the study of
law. Professor Hohfeld, like Holmes before him,' 5 sharply distinguished between "purely legal relations" and "the physical and
14. The development of distinct rules for res immobilis and res mobilis is a late one in
Roman law, W. W. BUCKLAND & A.D. McNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAw 57 (1936), was
only of subordinate interest, W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 186 (1932), and is
apparently the outgrowth of a land-based economy, H.F. JOLOwIcz, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAw ch. 4 (1952).
15. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 169-70, 192-93 (M. Howe ed. 1967).
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mental facts that call such relations into being."
cized

6

He strongly criti-

the tendency to confuse or blend non-legal and legal conceptions . . . . The word "property" furnishes a striking
example. Both with lawyers and with laymen this term has
no definite or stable connotation. Sometimes it is employed
to indicate the physical object to which various legal rights,
privileges, etc., relate; then again-with far greater discrimination and accuracy-the word is used to denote the
legal interest (or aggregate of legal relations) appertaining
to such physical object. Frequently there is a rapid and
fallacious shift from the one meaning to the other. At times,
also, the term is used in such a "blended" sense as to convey no definite meaning whatever."
"All legal interests," he said, "are 'incorporeal'-consisting as they
do, of more or less limited aggregates of abstract legal relations."' 8
Hohfeld proceeded thence to develop a scheme of legal relations
which are embedded in a matrix of "legal opposites" and "legal
correlatives." These relations he termed his "fundamental legal
conceptions," into which he believed all legal relations may be cast.
Just as mass of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries existed,
having primary (Newton's laws of motion) and secondary qualities
(color, texture, smell)," there exists for Hohfeld only these relations,
and no others; his fundamental conceptions are the total stuff of
legal existence. He was not, however, as was Newton, concerned
with cause and effect, and so Hohfeld is, quite properly, not to be
viewed so much as undertaking to predict the outcome of legal
disputes 0 as he is to be predicting the selection of parties-litigant.
He was showing who was involved in legal relations.
The realty and personalty ownership identification scheme
drawn above, however, indicates that we do not so freely as we
suppose discriminate among the "facts" to which legal incidents
attach. Society constrains the selection of operative facts which give
16. W.N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING
27 (W. Cook ed. 1919).
17. Id. at 28 [emphasis added].
18. Id. at 30.
19. A.N. WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD ch. III (1967).
20. M.S. McDouGAL & D. HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT 28 (1948).
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rise to legal consequences even on so basic a question as the things
we think we see before our very eyes. That is, under Hohfeld there
still exists the problem of the conceptualization or realization of the
physical things which are the subject of legal relations. It is as
though he had articulated a doctrine of secondary and not, as he had
supposed, primary qualities. In structuring our legal relations with
one another we reason from "property" as an existing legal datum.
Our environment is such that we have necessarily operated on two
inconsistent bases in conceptualizing property. Returning to Whitehead, we have discovered an obvious instance of what he happily
has termed "the fallacy of misplaced correctness." ' 21 Property is as
close as the nose on your face.
Having thus reasoned our way this far, we should not be surprised to discover that the bankers have had a difficult time explaining to us the difference between their security interest and our
ownership. We have just finished devising a system that operates to
shift ownership from one person to another based upon profound
physical and social imperatives. There is no event of comparable
import which operates to create security interests. Things looking
much the same as they had before the occurrence of the non-event,
it is not entirely clear how ownership of the values associated with
some property is to be segregated from a security interest in those
values. Even with forty years' experience in drafting modern security interest legislation, no satisfactory regime has emerged. In com2
parison to ownership, security interests simply do not make sense.
The security interest article of the Uniform Commercial Code,
Article 9, is notable for its attempt to impose some order out of preexisting chaos on both these points. But the draftsmen were more
successful at prescribing the ritual of security interest "creation"
(and succession) than they were at imagining what a security interest is like. Rock. Book. House. All call something to mind. But what
of the "purchase money security interest in dealer's inventory?" Or
"secured loan covering future advances and after-acquired property?" Here we are operating at a rather high degree of abstraction.
21. A.N. WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY 10 (1969). This is not to say a great deal,
however. It would be of interest to place what might be termed the Fundamental Legal
Objects, such as the two-fold property scheme, within his philosophy of organism. The author's references to "space," "matter": and the "subject" of legal relations would be viewed
by Whitehead as utterances that were either abstract, or worse, archaic and, if presented as
statements of philosophic or metaphysical truth, false.
22. Neither do future interests. Or leases. We have it that tenure played no substantial
part in Roman law, i.e., ownership was capable of horizontal succession but not vertical
extension. W.W. BUCKLAND & A.D. McNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 60 (1936).
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And what does one have when one captures either of these things?
By way of explanation of these questions, the author proposes
to discuss the rather dry and technical subject of fixture priority
under Article 9.23 It is the subject which first captured the author's
rather perverse attention and anticipated the preceding discussion.
Incidentally, an interesting episode in the Code's drafting history
tends to confirm the vitality of the property ownership scheme. The
Code, as it was originally submitted for adoption, attempted to do
away with much of the distinction between real and personal property in controversies between real estate parties and fixture-secured
lenders.2 4 Under the Code as then submitted, however wellincorporated some collateral might be into real estate, the secured
party could, under certain conditions, remove it. (The chief limiting
principle was that the real estate owner be repaid for damages occasioned by removal of the personalty, thus giving partial recognition
to realty ownership. Clearly, the realty owner loses something on
removal.) Apparently the old pressures were stronger than the
Code's draftsmen had supposed, for the realty distinction quickly
reappeared in subsequent proposed official drafts.2 5 "Incorporated"
goods became realty. Of course, objections voiced by real estate
interests could have played some part in circumscribing the availa23. See

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

9-313 [hereinafter cited as UCC]. Because the

1972 revisions of 9-313 have not been widely adopted, all references are, unless indicated
otherwise, to the 1962 Official Text of the Code. Other sections in the Article making explicit
reference to fixtures are cited in Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1319, 1323 n. 11 (1962); they are 9-104(j), 9-302(1)(c) and
(d), 9-401 and 9-402. For a discussion of the 1972 changes to 9-313 see PERMANENT EDITORIAL
BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT No. 2 § A (1970); Coogan,
The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARv. L. REV. 477 (1973); Funk, The Proposed Revision of Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (pts. 1-2), 26 Bus. L. 1465 (1971), 27 Bus. L. 321 (1971);
Hawkland, The ProposedAmendments to Article 9 of the UCC-Part3: Fixtures, 77 COMM.
L. J. 43 (1972); Panel Discussion, A Look at the Work of the Article 9 Review Committee, 26
Bus. L. 307 (1970). An earlier draft is discussed in Gordon, Credit Sales of Installed Equipment-The Uniform Commercial Code's Uneasy Truce Between Realty and Chattel Financing Interests, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 651 (1970); Henson, Fixtures: A Commentary on the Official
Proposed Changes in Article 9, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 179 (1968); Leary & Rucci, Fixing Up the
Fixture Section of the U.C.C., 42 TEMP. L. Q. 355 (1969).
See 1 GILMORE § 30.2 n. 3 for citation to principle treatments of fixture priority. Also
includable are Coogan, Fixtures-Uniformity in Words or in Fact?, 113 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1186
(1965); Gordon, Henson, Leary & Rucci, all supra. For a general review of the priority scheme
of 9-313 and problems thereunder, see Gordon, supra.
A recent and interesting discussion of the operation of the distinction between real and
personal property in another context appears in Note, Legal Characterizationof the Individual's Interest in a Cooperative Apartment: Realty or Personalty? 73 COLUM. L. REv. 250
(1973), which presents the delightful difficulty of a tag upon a tag, with something, the
"corporation", in between.
24. UCC § 9-313 (1952 Official Draft), discussed in 2 GILMORE § 30.2.
25. See, e.g., UCC § 9-313(2) (1972 Official Text).
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bility of collateral for non-realty secured lenders."5 But their objections seem to have come only after submission of the change, not
before. Significantly, the new drafts were explained as being offered
"primarily for clarification." 7
But we digress. We hope, by what follows, to establish that the
incidents of a Code security interest with "priority" (an answer to
the question "What is a security interest?") have been indicated in
only patchwork fashion, even though priority for security interests
is a central or, one might even say, the only concern of Article 9. It
will appear that lenders, in deciding what they would get from property, have chosen those incidents for legislative treatment which
were most likely to encourage the borrower to disgorge his indebtedness and, as between lenders, to give the early bird the worm. This
observation, together with our discussion of the property systems
will, it is hoped, additionally prove useful to those who have wrestled with troublesome fixture priority problems. It will be helpful,
at the outset, to consider three other problems general to the Code
priority allocation scheme.
Doubtless among the most discussed problems of Article 9 are
those related to what might be called the "transformation" of personalty collateral and its attendant effects on security interest priority. Raw materials or component parts become a finished product.
Or, without any physical alteration, collateral may be transformed
as the use to which it is put changes. Collateral in the hands of one
person may be inventory, and in the hands of another, equipment
or consumer goods. 2 After each transformation a question remains
26. The real estate bar gave little help to the drafting of the Code's fixture section,
Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 44, 47 (1964),
although evidently it was invited to do so. Mentschikoff, The Uniform Commercial Code: An
Experiment in Democracy in Drafting, 36 A.B.A.J. 419 (1950). General acceptance of the
Code was not without controversy. See Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798 (1958). Lenders who use real estate as collateral
were evidently slow to awaken to whatever problems were created for them by the 1952
Official Text. Although the 1952 version of 9-313 seemed to invite a diversion of consumer
hard goods financing from the savings and loan industry to the banking industry, a contemporary discussion of the "package mortgage" by representatives of the savings and loan industry
contains no reference to the infant Code. Russell & Prather, The Flexible Mortgage Contract,
19 LEGAL BULL. 73 (1953). Objections by real estate interests apparently came into full bloom
only after submission of the arguably more favorable 1956 version (which is the present
version of 9-313). See Coogan, Fixtures-Uniformity in Words or in Fact?, 113 U. PA. L. REV.
1186, 1190 (1965). Perhaps the subsequent reaction is just another instance of rising expectations unmatched by comparable performance.
27. 2 GILMORE § 30.3.
28. UCC § 9-109 and accompanying comments; Coogan, supra note 26, at 1222.
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whether a pre-existing security interest subsists in the reclassified
collateral and whether it shall be entitled to priority over some
conflicting interest. In these situations, section 9-312(5),s the
Code's general rule for determining the "when" of priority (i.e.,
whether A shall have priority over B) cannot apply to produce a
result.
Essentially, the general "when" rule states that he who takes
an interest in the thing first receives priority ("taking" to involve
"attaching" and "perfecting" the security interest). There are, of
course, numerous exceptions to this basic rule; special reasons are
offered to justify them. In at least two situations this general rule
will not provide a "priority" result. First, the lending party may
make a series of advances instead of one, and if the security interest
of some third party intervenes, a question remains whether subsequent advances are entitled to the same priority as those made prior
to intervention.3 0 The first taker rule of 9-312(5) is confounded when
someone is both a first and second taker. Section 9-313 has resulted
in a curious twist or two; 3' and when future advances are contemplated by the real estate mortgagee, he may in some circumstances
reverse his usual posture.32 The argument is detailed in the preceding footnote.
29. There is some question where the general priority allocation rule resides. Gilmore,
for example, suggests that it may be in all of 9-312, not just 9-312(5). 2 GILMORE § 29.4. He
has also referred to 9-312(5) alone as the "general or residual rule." Id. at § 34.1. Another
candidate is 9-201, although it seems to be largely overlooked in the literature.
30. Priority of future advances is discussed in Ege, Priorityof FutureAdvances Lending
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, in 2 P.F. COOGAN, W.E. HOGAN & D.F. VAGTS, SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ch. 21B (1969).
31. 2 GILMORE § 30.6.2.
32. Where a real estate mortgagee makes future advances, as in a construction loan,
he may in some circumstances reverse his usual posture. Usually, the question whether a
series of advances creates one or many discrete security interests becomes important when a
party argues that, because an earlier advance is preferred, a later advance should be also.
The argument is that one interest is created by a series of advances, preventing the third
party from coming in "ahead of" later advances, or to use more familiar terminology, because
the later advances "relate back" to the earlier, and "prior," advance.
Suppose a real estate construction mortgagee, before affixation, agrees to provide advances for construction of the building to which fixture collateral will be affixed. The mortgagee records his mortgage. Subsequent to affixation of fixture collateral to which a fixture
security interest has already attached, the construction mortgagee makes two advances, one
before and one after perfection of the fixture security interest. Here the real estate party
cannot look back to some golden advance entitled to priority over the fixture man; the fixture
financer will be quick to cite 9-313(2). But the mortgagee can look forward. If the fixture
security interest has attached prior to affixation of the collateral but the fixture security
interest is not perfected until after the mortgagee makes an advance, the mortgagee will argue
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Second, one item of collateral may be added to, mixed or
worked into some other item of collateral. Unless there is some way
to restore the status quo ante (as by disassembly), it is impossible
to say which interest was taken first in the collateral. The identifying tag no longer serves to indicate the collateral subject to the
secured party's interest or the order in which he took that interest.
The physical, tangible thing subsists, however, so the security interest, too, must survive the change. Where no physical alteration
occurs but the collateral classification is changed through use, the
question of whether the "old" collateral subsists in the "new" seems
attributable solely to the Code's classification scheme and not to the
personal property ownership identification scheme; clearly an automobile is an automobile, whether held by a dealer as inventory or
used by a consumer for personal, family or household purposes.
Much difficulty derives from the absence of a well-worn and obvious
test for shifting from one classification to another and the Code's
cumbersome 3 ten-fold collateral classification.
Both of these general problems to the Code's first-taker rule
may arise where fixture collateral is involved. As to the second,
involving some change of the collateral, where fixture collateral is
annexed to realty, there does not appear to be any correct view of
the priority to which the fixture secured party is to be entitled or
subject. Viewed apart from property reclassification, it is a little
difficult to say which interest came first-the Code-created security
interst in the "unattached" personalty or the real estate interest in
the "fixed" realty to which it is later attached. Indeed, one is almost
tempted to say that the collateral disappears (as when goods are
"incorporated"). Where two tangible things, both subject to a security interest, are inseparably and indistinguishably joined, the genthat his advances create a series of discrete security interests, not a single interest, so as to
divorce his later advances from his earlier, subordinated one. This argument apparently still
pinions the mortgagee for his post-fixture-perfection discrete advance. Of course, the mortgagee whose interest arose after affixation and before perfection of the security interest in the
fixture collateral would argue a single rather than a multiple security interest view so as to
entitle even post-perfection advances to priority. It is arguable that such result is permitted
under 9-313(4) if the post-perfection advances were contracted for before perfection but after
affixation. Section 9-313 may also be read to deny priority to persons specified in 9-313(4) if
they had a real estate interest of any type existing at the time the fixture collateral was
affixed. This result occurs by virtue of 9-313(2) in any case where these persons are not
explicitly given priority under 9-313(4). Compare Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 H-Lv. L. REv. 1319, 1329 n. 21 (1962).
33. See 2 GILMORE § 12.1.
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eral rule of priority allocation cannot assign priority because a security interest attaches to personal property.
Still a third problem general to the Code's priority allocation
scheme complicates analysis of fixture priority. Unlike the first two,
it seems not to have been generally recognized or discussed. What
is a security interest having priority? It is submitted that "priority"
is a term of variable content, that greater attention upon the incidents of a security interest with priority is in order, and this very
inattention accounts in part for the difficulty which has surrounded
understanding of fixture priority. It is not the purpose here to develop a general scheme for the incidents of a security interest with
priority or even a scheme for fixtures. If removal be the incident of
chief commercial importance, such an exercise would have little
utility in any event. 4 The purpose rather is to note the absence of
such a scheme and some of the difficulties to which it leads, principally in cases where lenders try to assert incidents of their security
interest unforeseen by the legislative draftsmen. A comment secreted under section 9-113 seems to acknowledge that the incidents
may differ,35 but the draftsmen did not, as did the authors of Com34. Commentaries on Code fixture priorities regularly cite case law examples of the
setting in which the disputes they propose to discuss take place. They leave it to the reader's
surmise, however, to determine how representative of transactional and dollar volume such
examples may be. Little improvement on this omission can be offered here except, perhaps,
to note its presence. Some Federal Reserve statistics do give a clue to the incidence of fixture
financing, but only a clue. Thus, the Federal Reserve indicated recently that outstanding
term and non-term commercial and industrial loans of large commercial banks for January
1973 totaled over $92 billion. Business expenditures on (but not necessarily borrowings for)
new plant and equipment (but not necessarily fixtures) for all business for the third quarter
of 1972 were $22 billion, an annual adjusted rate of $88 billion. At the end of December 1972,
total consumer installment credit was over $127 billion, about $83 billion of which was for
consumer goods paper (excluding automobile paper), personal loans, and repairs and modernization. Fed. Reserve Bull., February 1973, at A-31, A-50, A-56.
It is difficult, then, to ascertain the practical significance of fixture priority problems.
The weight which lenders attach to having a security interest when they decide whether to
extend credit, and particularly whether their security interest will have priority (whatever
may be the effects of having it) is, of course, a measure of the practical significance of priority
problems. It may be that for fixture secured lenders their priority status (as a necesary
condition to their power to remove the fixture from the realty) is of more importance in their
decision to extend credit than is the priority status to other secured lenders (especially since,
as to non-fixture collateral, priority does not seem to determine the secured party's power to
reduce collateral to possession. See UCC § 9-503).
35. Under the provisions of Article 2 on Sales, a seller of goods may reserve a
security interest (see, e.g., Sections 2-401 and 2-505); and in certain circumstances,
whether or not a security interest is reserved, the seller has rights of resale and
stoppage under Sections 2-703 . . . and 2-706 which are similar to the rights of a
secured party. Similarly, under such sections as Sections 2-506, 2-707 and 2-711, a
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ment 1 of section 4-201,11 attempt to set up a general rule to be
applied in the absence of a specific provision otherwise; the omission
of such a general rule has produced unfortunate results for the
courts.
Unlike most earlier secured transaction legislation, Article 9
deals with the priority of the security interests it creates.37 Prior to
widespread enactment of the Code, its priority provisions were
touted as providing "specific answers to specific priority problems. '3 While this assertion is strictly correct, it bears qualification. It may be that the Code settled, or at least attempted to settle,
the priority problems that needed to be settled and left the rest.
Nevertheless, it is instructive to explore some questions which its
priority provisions, seemingly not of design, did not resolve.
Article 9 of the Code employs a variety of terms to indicate that
the claim to collateral (the security interest) of one person is to be
preferred over
that of another. By far the most commonly used is
"priority. '3 But the claim of one party may be preferred over that
of another because his claim is "valid" against him,4" even though
"validity" seems to go to the enforceability of a security interest
financing agency, an agent, a buyer or another person may have a security interest
or other right in goods similar to that of a seller ....
UCC § 9-113 Comment 1 [emphasis supplied]. This comment, of course, is not explicitly
limited to the rights of secured parties whose security interests have priority, although the
cited sections look to situations bearing a similarity to the priority contests of Article 9.
36. Comment 1 to 4-201 reads:
This section states certain basic rules and presumptions of the bank collection
process. One basic rule, appearing in the last sentence of subsection (1), is that, to
the extent applicable, the provisions of the Article govern without regard to whether
a bank handling an item owns the item or is an agent for collection. Historically,
much time has been spent and effort expended in determining or attempting to
determine whether a bank was a purchaser of an item or merely an agent for collection . . . .The general approach of Article 4, similar to that of other articles, is to
provide, within reasonable limits, rules or answers to major problems known to exist
in the bank collection process without regard to questions of status and ownership
. . .available to cover residual areas not covered by specific rules.
37. 2 GILMORE 655.
38. Coogan, PrioritiesAmong Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," in 1 P.F.
COOGAN, W.E. HOGAN & D.F. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 693 (1969). The essay, as originally published, did not contain this statement. See
Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: PrioritiesAmong Secured Creditorsand
the "FloatingLien," 72 HARV. L. Rlv. 838 (1959).
39. The word "priority" (or "priorities" or "prior") used to indicate this preference
appears in 9-301, 9-306, 9-308, 9-309, 9-310, 9-312, 9-313, 9-314, 9-315 and 9-316.
40. See UCC §§ 9-103, 9-201, 9-205, 9-313 and 9-314.
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between secured party and debtor. 4 Still a third mode of expression
is "protected against"4 or the variation "protection of," popular
among the commentators.4 3 Finally, the Code occasionally, and solecistically, speaks of one interest being "subordinate to" "the rights
of" another party."
Assuming these are all various modes of expressing the same
preferred status, one may ask what consequences result from a finding that a secured party has priority. What are the incidents of a
security interest with priority over some other interest? They have
been given, in some instances, by explicit Code provision. Apparently at least two incidents of priority are important: first, the finding stands as a bulwark against the trustee in bankruptcy. Priority
over the trustee cum "lien creditor" gives assurances of reclamation
of the collateralized debtor's property." Uncertainties in character41. The ambiguity of the term "validity" is discussed in 2 GILMORE §§ 30.3, 44.11,
which discuss respectively 9-313 and 9-103.
42. See UCC H§ 9-306(5)(d), 9-307 and 9-309.
43. See, e.g., Funk, The Proposed Revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 26 Bus. LAw. 1465, 1470 (1971); Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
64 COLUM. L. REv. 44, 46 (1964).
44. See UCC H8 9-301, 9-306(5)(c). Apparently still another Code priority phrase is the
"rank equally" of 9-315(2).
45. [T~he liquidation provisions of the [Bankruptcy] Act (§§ 1-72) aim at
distribution of the bankrupt's unencumbered assets (except exempt property) among
his general, unsecured creditors, with certain of these creditors given a priority.
3 W.M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 60.01 (J.W. Moore & L.P, King eds. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
Considerable confusion exists in bankruptcy administration because of a failure to
distinguish clearly between a valid lien and a right to prior payment from unencumbered assets. The former entails a right to enforcement independent of bankruptcy;
it may be created by agreement or statute, or by judgment of a court. The latter is a
narrow right to payment at a certain relative point in the distribution of a bankrupt
debtor's property, naked of any power of levy or attachment; it is a creature of the
Bankruptcy Act. . . . A valid lien, subject to the qualifications and restrictions
previously stated, is a charge against assets which must be met before distribution
to unsecured creditors begins. A right to priority accords an unsecured claim a particular precedence over other claims in the distribution of the bankrupt's remaining
assets.
3A COLLIER § 64.02(2). One must tread with caution, therefore, when speaking of priority in
bankruptcy.
The trustee in bankruptcy will, under some appropriate provision of the act, "invalidate"
a security interest, 3 COLLIER § 60.01, thus making the collateral available for distribution.
To the extent that any Code provision prevents such invalidation it may be regarded as a
priority section with regard to the bankrupt's unsecured and other creditors. From this point
of view, then, 9-108, a response to § 60 of the Act, is a priority section. So, too, are 9-203
and 9-204, affecting the creation of security intrests, since security interests created pursuant
to these sections would be valid against the trustee and thus prior to the bankrupt's unsecured
creditors absent the special avoiding powers given the trustee, e.g., in § 70 of the Act.
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izing fixture collateral as either "real property" or "other than real
property" complicate questions concerning the invalidation by the
trustee of security interests in such collateral. Bankruptcy considerations have also led to criticisms of the Code's fixture priority section." Second, should the collateral be sold by a secured party on
One reaches a Code finding of priority and goes thence to the Act to prevent invalidation
when the trustee seeks to assert his powers under § 70. A lien creditor without knowledge of
a secured party's interest is subordinate to that interest if it is perfected. It would be a minor
point to argue that it is, or should be, a secured party's priority by virtue of 9-301 of the Code,
rather than the perfected status of his security interest, which gives his security interest
validity over the trustee were the incidents of a security interest not so confused. Compare 1
GILMORE § 30.6 at 821, which is not necessarily inconsistent with this view.
It is not the purpose here to recount the battle between secured parties and the bankruptcy trustee. For an account, see 2 GILMORE § 45.
46. If, under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, a security interest is not good or perfected
against certain parties prior to the time of filing the petition, the transfer "shall be deemed
to have been made immediately before the filing of the petition." 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2). By
statutory movement of the transfer forward, the debt becomes antecedent, and the security
interest may then be avoided by the trustee if other conditions of a § 60 voidable preference
are satisfied. The parties against whom the transfer must be good or prior at the time of filing
of the petition vary with the nature of the collateral. If the collateral transferred is real
property, then the transfer is deemed made "when it became so far perfected that no subsequent bona fide purchaser could create rights . . . superior to the rights of the transferee."
Id. Thus, for real property, a transfer occurs presumably when the real estate interest is
recorded (or is otherwise perfected). For "property other than real property" the transfer
occurs when no "subsequent lien ...
could become superior to the rights of the transferee."
Id. For such property, presumably, a security interest must be perfected under the Code. For
both classes of property, the lender must exercise care to see that he does not, by delay in
perfecting, himself cause the transfer to be given for an antecedent debt.
In attempting to reconcile § 60 of the Act and 9-313 of the Code, several questions are
distinguishable: (1) the classification of fixtures as "real estate" or "other"; (2) the persons
against whom transfers must be good; (3) the means by which such transfers may be made
good, i.e., by chattel filing, by fixture filing or by real estate recording (or by other means of
real estate perfection); and (4) as to each of the preceding questions, which law-the Bankruptcy Act, the Uniform Commercial Code, or other law of the enacting state-applies. Given
these variables, there are 36 possible combinations, some of which, of course, may be quickly
eliminated. Assuming the Bankruptcy Act does not determine the first and third questions,
one is left with the question of how to consider 9-313(1). That subsection expressly disclaims
an intention to determine when goods become fixtures, pretending to leave that question to
the local law of the enacting state. Subsection 9-313(1) does not, however, expressly leave the
question of the classification of fixtures as goods or realty to such other law, just the question
of when goods become fixtures. Contra, Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 44, 62 (1964). In any event, such delicacy seems feigned, Coogan,
Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1319,
1348 (1963). Section 9-313 classifies fixtures as goods or realty; it also, by analogy, indicates
when fixtures become real estate, viz., upon "incorporation."
Assuming that by reading 9-313 one can decide whether an item is personalty, fixtures
or real estate, it says that, for purposes of deciding whether the fixture security interest is or
is not antecedent, the applicable test for the adverse claimant is left to the Bankruptcy Act,
i.e., either lien creditor or bona fide purchaser. Other questions, however, are decided by 9313. The adverse claimant is regarded as asserting an interest in fixtures, not in personalty
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debtor's default, priority establishes the order of distribution of proceeds generated by the sale." Moreover, without regard to their
participation in the distribution of proceeds, secured parties whose
security interests are subordinate to that of a secured party will
have their security interests discharged." Apparently, a subordinate
secured party may not discharge the security interests of those with
priority over him, although he may dispose of the collateral without
the consent of the secured parties who have priority over him.4 9 The
suggestion has been made in the fixture context, however, that if a
fixture secured party is subordinate to a subsequent real estate interest, the real estate interest takes free of the fixture secured
party's interest. Put differently, subordination of the fixture interest
amounts to a discharge of that interest with respect to the real
estate interest." How difficult it is to maintain a distinction between affixed personalty and realty! Also, in the fixture context,
priority has a special meaning; it conditions the fixture secured
party's right to assume possession of the collateral. This precondior realty. Thus, perfection is by means of a fixture filing, not chattel filing or recording.
Whether a lien creditor test or a bona fide purchaser test be used, the fixture filing is good
against the adverse claimant, since there seems to be no adverse interest not caught up in
the net of either 9-313(2) or (4). Section 9-313 has been criticized for requiring perfection
against lien creditors, 2 GILMORE § 30.6; Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1319, 1342 (1962); Kripke, Fixtures Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 44, 59 (1964), but by doing so the draftsmen
provided a basis for arguing that the security interest in fixtures is good under either test.
Section 9-313 defines the item of collateral for purposes of means of perfection, excludes
argument that the adverse party is taking an interest in personalty or real estate (so that
perfecting must be by chattel filing or recording), leaves the applicable test adverse claimant
to the Bankruptcy Act, but makes the fixture security interest good against either claimant
if there has been a fixture filing. As to an item either personalty or real estate, a chattel filing
or real estate recording is required, and the appropriate test will be the lien creditor or bona
fide purchaser test.
Such, at least, are arguments which the fixture secured creditor who has perfected by
fixture filing may make in response to the trustee. For a discussion of invalidation of the
security interest under § 70, see Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 64
COLUM. L. REv. 44, 59 (1964).
47. UCC § 9-504(1).
48. Id. § 9-504(4). Sections 9-306(2) and 9-504(1) appear to give a definition of "disposed of." Under 9-504(4), any secured party, whether his interest is perfected or not, and
without regard to his priority, may discharge the security interests or liens of subordinate
parties.
49. UCC § 9-504(4) (by negative implication).
50. Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 75
HARv. L. REv. 1319, 1343 (1962). On the other hand, Gilmore has intimated that the fixture
secured party with priority has an "absolute priority," i.e., that the removed fixture is not
subject to the interests of real estate parties. He speaks of the "absolute priority which Article
9 gives to purchase money interests, fixtures interests and the like." 2 GILMORE § 32.5.
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tion to possession is to be contrasted with the general rule that
default is a sufficient condition to possession of non-fixture collateral.5
The foregoing, then, has highlighted what might be described
as the Code's preference umbra-circumstances defined by the
Code with some particularity in which a finding of priority directs
certain consequences and tells the secured lender what he "gets."
But Code priority also generates a penumbra, a shadow area where
Code-specified consequences only partially block out the prior, and
nonuniform, local rules of competing creditors' rights. Under the
Code, priority has operated as a catchall term which directs that
wheresoever and howsoever one security interest comes in conflict
with another interest as to which it has priority, the secured party
with priority "wins," pre-existing law notwithstanding.5 2
A sampling of recent Code cases indicates the variety of unforeseen contexts in which the priority question may be raised and
reveals the uncertain content of the priority directive. Many courts
seem to experience difficulty in deciding which particular Code provisions should be applied to a specific factual situation. Thus, there
is New York authority for the proposition that, as between two
51. UCC § 9-503. Under this section, a secured party may assume possession on
debtor's default whether or not he has priority over certain other parties and whether or not
his security interest is perfected. The 9-313 priority requirement is, like the reimbursement
provision of 9-313(5), a recognition of the realty ownership interest.
52. A cognate problem concerns those areas seemingly without the Code priority penumbra and whether, given two possible rules, the court should adopt that which will create
the most "victories" for the secured party. Riesenfeld, discussing 9-301, remarks:
[11n limiting the protection of creditors against unperfected security interests to
creditors who have acquired a lien by judicial process during the period of nonperfection the framers of the Code made a studious choice beteeen the two principal
approaches to that problem existing under the pre-Code law . . . . [11n one the
protection depended upon the extension of credit prior to the delayed perfection,
while in the other the acquisition of a lien by judicial process was the essential
criterion. ...
Although the Code has reduced tremendously the great disparity existing among
the states in that respect, nevertheless there is still room for variations for the reason
that §§ 9-301(1)(a) and (3) leave it to the applicable state law to determine at what
time and in what fashion the crucial lien is acquired and that the local laws differ
widely in that matter.
S.A. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBToRS' PROTECTION 131 (1967). A New York
court went further, intimating that if a judgment lien was "perfected" before the security
interest of a secured party, the secured party's interest was discharged at the sheriffs sale,
the purchaser took free of the security interest, and moreover, the secured party could not
participate in proceeds generated by this sale. William Iselin & Co. v. Burgess & Leigh, Ltd.,
52 Misc. 2d 821, 276 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
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secured parties, the secured party whose security interest has priority over the other is entitled to possession, assuming both parties are
under the terms of their respective security agreements.5 3 The secured party with priority may, therefore, replevy the collateral from
the possession of the subordinate secured party but the subordinate
secured party who has obtained possession pursuant to his security
agreement is not liable in damages to the prior party for wrongful
detention.5 4 And in Pennsylvania, a secured party whose security
interest is unperfected and is subordinate to that of another secured
party will apparently have his security interest discharged if the
secured party with priority acquires possession of the collateral as
a purchaser at an execution sale held at the instance of an unsecured
judgment creditor. This result even though, under section 9-504(4),
the collateral was not disposed of by the secured party with priority.55 Also, there is New York authority for the proposition that a
53. Recchio v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 55 Misc. 2d 788, 286 N.Y.S.2d 390
(Sup. Ct. 1968).
54. Id.
55. Bloom v. Hilty, 427 Pa. 463, 234 A.2d 860 (1967), noted in 67 MICH. L. REv. 1421
(1969). In Bloom, the plaintiff brought a replevin action against the purchaser at a sheriffs
execution sale. The court indicated, on authority of 9-301(1)(c), that purchasers without
knowledge of a security interest would take the collateral free of an unperfected security
interest. It is unclear whether, independent of the sale, a prior secured party in possession
would take free of a subordinated security interest. Interestingly, the court straddles both 9301(1)(a) (unperfected security interest v. persons entitled to priority under 9-312) and 9312(5)(b) (security interest perfected other than by filing v. other security interest, however
perfected, i.e., priority as between two security interests, both already perfected) in awarding
priority to the prior, perfected security interest. The case is at least susceptible to the reading
that a secured party with a perfected security interest may acquire possession free of a
subordinate, unperfected security interest. The court says the prior secured party is "protected to the extent of its security interest," 427 Pa. 463, 466, 234 A.2d 860, 863 (1967) and
again, that the prior party "prevails over" the subordinate one, 427 Pa. 463, 467, 234 A.2d
860, 864 (1967).
It is noteworthy that in seeking to answer the question before it (viz., entitlement to
possession), the court found itself on an excursis concerning the disposition of proceeds. That
the prior secured party bid only $1 and received not only what he had sold the debtor but
also $7,500 worth of pipe to boot may in part account for the court's difficulty in maintaining
focus. But surely one may distinguish questions of entitlement to possession from questions
of entitlement to proceeds, just as one may distinguish among priority allocation rules, and
as to them, which may apply to the case sub judice (if, indeed, any do). See Note, 67 MICH.
L. Rav. 1421 (1969), which argues that the disposition of interests at an execution sale is a
matter left uncovered by the Code priority rules.
The questions of (1) the events which serve to discharge a security interest (with a
consequent loss of a right to possession), and (2) the existence of a right to and the order of
participationin the proceeds generated upon an execution sale are therefore distinguishable.
If the Pennsylvania court provided answers to these questions, it seems that a measure of
clarity would have been added to its opinion if it had distinguished them before proceeding
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secured party with priority over a lien creditor may vacate his levy5"
and Wisconsin authority that he may do so only if his right to
possession arose before rather than after the sheriff's execution. 57
Under other New York authority, the purchaser at a sheriff's sale
takes subject to the interest of a secured party with priority over the
lien creditor who caused the execution to be issued."
The contrariety of views, if not of result, in this sampling of
cases suggests a need to make concrete the effect of the award of
priority to a secured party by specific Code provision. Or, as Madison Avenue would put it, to give security interests "new body,"
priority-wise.
In general, it can be said that insufficient attention has been
given to the strategic position which lenders with collateral do and
should occupy inter se and with respect to their borrowers. Their
assertion of an interest akin to an ownership interest in return for
supplying the borrower the financial wherewithal for some enterprise which he has undertaken and which may or may not relate to
the collateralized property raises broad questions of policy. A debate
to answer them. The results themselves seem permissible under (although hardly commanded
by) provisions in the Code cited by the court; the court was operating within the Code's
priority penumbra.
56. William Iselin & Co. v. Burgess & Leigh, Ltd., 52 Misc. 2d 821, 276 N.Y.S.2d 659
(Sup. Ct. 1967).
57. First National Bank of Glendale v. Sheriff of Milwaukee County, 34 Wis.2d 535, 149
N.W.2d 548 (1967). William Iselin & Co. v. Burgess & Leigh, Ltd., 52 Misc. 2d 821, 276
N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup. Ct. 1967) permitted the secured party to vacate the levy even though the
secured party contended that its right to possession did not arise until after the levy attached.
The Wisconsin court cited 9-312 and a Wisconsin amendment to the Code in support of its
decision, stating that "creditors without the right of possession of the goods are protected only
by the fact that the execution sale is subject to their interest." First National Bank of
Glendale v. Sheriff of Milwaukee County, supra at 538, 149 N.W.2d at 551. The court did
not indicate whether this protection meant that a purchaser at the sale took subject to the
secured party's security interest or whether it meant that the secured party was entitled to
participate in the distribution of proceeds generated by the sheriff's sale. Unlike the security
interest in Bloom v. Hilty, 427 Pa. 463, 234 A.2d 860 (1967), the security interest in Glendale,
supra, was apparently perfected. Also indicating that a secured party whose security interest
has priority over a lien creditor may not vacate the levy is Altec Lansing v. Friedman Sound
Inc., 204 So.2d 740 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 3d Dist., 1967), but that court did not distinguish
between a right to possession arising before and one arising after the levy. The security
interest, the court said, will not be discharged by the sheriffs sale. The Altec court, in
reaching its decision, relied upon pre-Code chattel mortgage law, a Code decision in a sister
state, and 9-311!
58. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Stotsky, 60 Misc. 2d 451, 303 N.Y.S.2d 463
(Sup. Ct. Special Term, 1969). It does not appear in this case whether the default occurred
before or after the judgment creditor's levy.
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over the questions raged for years in the grammar of punctilious
observance of the formal requisites of the "independent security
devices." The stirring of recent interest is seen in the discussion
surrounding the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act 59 and the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code. And the Supreme Court's suggestion of
late that the realization of collateral by the lender may raise questions of constitutional dimension and require a choice among competing values'" may give further impetus to a systematic review of
the place which secured credit should occupy in our economy or
polity. Surely a better measure of the lender's claim to a power to
dispose of an owner's property may be taken. It need not, of course,
be limited to the consumer context nor slight the importance of
finance to business enterprise (which, in turn, produces attendant
benefits and burdens).
The incidents to a security interest with "priority," then, have
been left in an untidy state. There is a general rule for determining
when a secured party is to receive priority for his security interest
(which works most of the time): the first-taker rule of section 9312(5). There is, however, no general rule for determining what that
security interest with priority shall constitute. This omission invites
a variety of solutions which the courts, of necessity, have provided.
It is not surprising, then, that analysis of fixture priority, with the
exception of the question of removal, has been a rather free-swinging
affair; the Code has not provided otherwise.
Directing our attention solely to fixture priority, the classification of property as either personalty or realty may be seen to further
complicate priority disputes. Section 9-313 has been taken as an
instance of the so-called "purchase money priority."'" New money
is, under the Code, given a circumscribed preference over old
money. This purchase money priority is viewed as an exception to
the first-taker rule of priority allocation because it permits later
created interests "in the same collateral" (i.e., the realty in fixture
cases) to prevail over earlier created ones.
59. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
60. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). For a discussion of the effect
of the 1972 revisions to Article 9, see Davenport, Default Procedures Under the Revised
Article 9, 7 VAL. U.L. REv. 265 (1973). The recently completed Hunt Commission Report
makes no recommendations on the foreclosure power questions raised here. Its secured credit
recommendations relate principally to improving the real estate mortgage markets.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL STRUCTRE AND REOULATION, REPORT (1971). But see id.
at 121.

61.

2 GILMORE § 30.6.1.
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But to view fixture priority as an exception to the first-taker
rule is to commit certain analytical errors. Essentially, it is the
problem of Mr. Davenport, in a realty-only world, moving lumber
about his tract of land. Perhaps we see here some of the "shifting"
or "blending" referred to by Hohfeld.52 Any collateral fixed into the
space owned by Mr. Davenport should belong to him, not because
it becomes part of a physical structure, but because it passes into a
space owned by Davenport. If the fixture remains movable, the
realty party should have no interest whatever in it, save as it intrudes upon the valuable incident of space ownership. The personalty owner, of course, may insist upon some utility space. If he did,
we would have a clear, as it were, conflict between two systems of
ownership identification, two different kinds of space. To remain
analytically pure, realty-secured and personalty-secured parties
should never have an interest in a common physical thing: one
either starts from the physical thing and builds an ownership system from there, or one starts with the owned space. Section 9-313,
which insists upon realty and personalty parties having an interest
in the same "thing," is in this respect incredibly bizarre and difficult to comprehend. 3
Were property classification not to enter into the question, however, fixture emplacement could be viewed as just another instance
of joined collateral for which the general allocation rule will provide
no result. To assign priority, therefore, to the fixture secured party
is not an exception to the result that would otherwise obtain under
the general first-taker rule.
It has been argued that a Code-created security interest, even
in goods not incorporated, may be extinguished for lack of priority. 4
62. See notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text.
63. It is interesting, in this light, that fixture priority received major attention in the
revisions to Article 9. "There has probably been more dissatisfaction with Section 9-313 of
the original Code than with any other section." Funk, The Proposed Revision of Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 Bus. LAw. 1465, 1468 (1971).
64. See note 50 supra. A cognate problem attends 9-313(4). Under that section an
unperfected security interest in fixtures does not take priority over certain real estate interests
which arise "subsequently." Not unnaturally, therefore, the commentators have been led to
ask " 'subsequent' to what?" 2 GILMORE § 30.6.3; see also Coogan, Security Interests in
Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1319, 1327 (1962); Kripke,
Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 44, 71 (1964). These
commentators have argued that certainly 9-313(4) may be read to deny priority to an unperfected security interest as against a real estate interest arising after physical annexation of
the collateral, but that the subsection may also be read to deny priority to the secured party
against real estate interests arising after attachment of the secured party's security interest
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This view of things may have led to the requirement of a "new act"
to reinstate the security interest in the new, attached thing. 5 But
this position uncritically accepts the characterization of property as
a determinant of the preferred (or unpreferred) status of a secured
creditor, of the "what" of a security interest with priority. It is a
confusion of the question of what the incidents of a preferred security interest shall be with the question of the necessity which gives
rise to a shift in the tagging rules from personalty to realty. We may
grit our teeth and insist that the security interest survives the transition from personalty to realty if it is our view that bankers should
receive the values incident to a security interest in space ownership
as well as the ownership of physical things. That personalty "becomes" realty tells us something about the wisdom of our decision.
It is not suggested here that any of the positions taken with
regard to the appropriate preference for fixture-secured security interests or the substance of that preference (to the extent that they
have been indicated at all) necessarily reflect inappropriate policy
judgments. Instead, it is submitted that, whatever priority rules be
deemed best, it will clarify discussion of the problem to distinguish
the rules for the allocation of a preference from the rules defining
the incidents or substance of a preference. It may also be appropriate to create (or to identify) a general rule specifying the incidents
of a security interest with priority to handle new situations. The
1972 revisions of Article 9 leave both these central difficulties untouched.66 Property creation and classification may be distinguished
(see UCC § 9-204), i.e., even before the collateral is physically wedded to the real estate. But
a real estate party may claim an interest in the collateral only if it is real estate; it is difficult
to see in what manner his real estate interest could arise before physical annexation. For
goods to be subsequently "swallowed up" in the realty, the realty must first take a bite-the
goods must alight on the deadly realty flower and then wait briefly so as to be ingested into
the inconsistent realty system. The "subsequent" language of 9-313(4), therefore, seems to
presuppose an analytic impossibility: the realty party takes an interest "subsequently" in
something (the goods) that does not exist. Compare Leary & Rucci, Fixing Up the Fixture
Section of the U.C.C., 42 TEMPLE L.Q. 355, 370 n. 37 (1969).
65. 1 GILMORE § 2.3.
66. The 1972 Amendments to Article 9 are extensively discussed in Coogan, The New
UCC Article 9, 86 HARv. L. REv. 477 (1973). This article will doubtless become, along with
the proposed text and comments themselves, a principal rallying point when the Amendments are introduced for enactment by the legislatures. Readers of both, however, would do
well to distinguish the priority allocation rules, which are the subject of Mr. Coogan's treatment, from the rules which define the substance of the "priority" preference, to whomever
given. These latter directives, as is the case in earlier official drafts of the Code, are left largely
to inference. Thus, in examining changes in the general priority allocation rule, 9-312(5), Mr.
Coogan remarks:
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from the above two problems. The process should not uncritically
operate to determine the existence or incidents of the priority status. Discussion of fixture priority has been troubled by a failure to
make these distinctions.
Property classification, then, operates in part as a function of
ownership identification. As it has developed, it is an all-or-nothing
affair. The reader is presumably willing, at this point, to suspend
his belief and to admit that physical, space-obtruding objects are,
in reality, neither personal nor real, but merely space-defining
things. Havoc would reign, however, if an object could be both personalty and realty; only one system may be used to identify the
owner. We would certainly go mad were not this the case. Fortunately, the profound difference in utility between things in motion
and things at rest helps to hold this dread possibility in
check-nature makes it easy. But fixtures, of course, are bogglers:
they call to mind the structuring of our environment by physical
things (suppose everything that is "emplaced" were disassembled
piece by piece), they bring painfully to our attention that the use
and enjoyment of our environment must be divided among society's
members, and finally, they challenge the ingenuity of our ownership
allocation scheme by suggesting the quickly repressed horror that,
under the alternate property schemes, an object may be owned by
Two examples can help to illustrate the scope of present (5)(a) and (5)(b). Consider
first the following case:
(i) June 1-A files as to Debtor's cotton but does no more at this time.
(ii) June 2-B files as to Debtor's cotton, executes a security agreement with
him, and advances $1,000.
(iii) June 10-A executes a security agreement with Debtor and advances
$1,200.
(iv) Debtor fails and the cotton is value at $1,000.
In this situation all of the cotton would go to A as the first to file. By its terms
paragraph (5)(a) controls regardless of the order in which the security interests arose
and regardless of the order in which they were perfected.
Id. at 508. Mr. Coogan then goes on to show that new 9-312(5)(a) would change the priority
result that presently obtains under existing 9-312(5)(b) where B perfects other than by filing.
Under the new provision A takes priority if he is either first to file or first to perfect. "While
the new Code does not change the result in the first example, the result in this second case is
reversed by revised 9-312(5)(a)," he explains. Id.
It is perhaps a quibble to suggest that manifestly all the cotton does not "go" to A
whether he takes priority under the old or new rule. In the first place, the 1972 revision leaves
9-503 unchanged, so B need only show a default to reduce the cotton to his possession. See
note 51, supra. And in the second place, under 9-504(1) (1972 Official Text) A would be
entitled over B to the proceeds generated upon a sale held subject to the provisions of new 9504, not the cotton. A would take the cotton as purchaser at the sale, and not by virtue of
his priority.
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more than one person at once-owned twice, as it were. Every tangible is Janus-faced, but it must look one way or the other and so
acknowledge its owner.
All this trouble proceeds from a prior necessity: to engender
ownership into the indifferent world of physical reality.
These are only minor points, though, since in the passage quoted Mr. Coogan is explaining the operation of the priority rules, not default procedures. But our point is made: a ready
confusion of the "priority" allocation question with the "priority" incident question, the what
of the preferred security interest. Consider 2 G~msoRE at 653-57.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1973

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 [1973], Art. 3

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol7/iss3/3

